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CASE COMMENTS
GOODWIN V. TURNER: CONS AND PRO-CREATING
THE DUE PROCESS clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution1 protects the individual's right
of personal privacy from intrusion by the State.' This right en-
compasses various personal rights including the right to bear or
beget children.3 "'If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.' "I
In Goodwin v. Turner,5 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion of the District Court for the Western District of Missouri6
and held that the policy of the defendant, Bureau of Prison ("Bu-
reau"), prohibiting inmates from artificially inseminating other
persons, did not violate plaintiff Goodwin's constitutional rights.7
1. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of ... liberty . . . without due process of law . U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIv.
2. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) ("Although '[t]he Con-
stitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,' the Court has recognized that
one aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is 'a right of personal privacy.. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977))).
3. Id. at 685.
4. Id. (quoting with insignificant error Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(emphasis omitted)).
5. 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
6. Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
7. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1396. The policy statement of the Bureau provides in part
that
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Goodwin is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the United States
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri
("Medical Center"). At the time of the Eighth Circuit's decision,
Goodwin's wife was thirty years old and not incarcerated. The
couple did not want to delay conception until the time of Good-
win's release because of the increased risk of birth defects that
accompanies escalating maternal age.8 By "the time of Goodwin's
latest release date in 1995, his wife will be thirty-five years old,"
and the likelihood of her bearing a child with genetic abnormali-
ties will have doubled.9 In the face of these discouraging statistics,
Goodwin requested that the Bureau provide him with a clean
container in which to deposit his ejaculate and that the container
be transported outside the prison to his wife. Mrs. Goodwin would
then be able to artificially inseminate herself and become preg-
nant before her husband would be released from prison. When the
Bureau denied his request, Goodwin filed a petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for incarcerating him in vio-
lation of his constitutional right to beget a child.' 0
The Eighth Circuit held that the Bureau's denial of Good-
win's request was a reasonable restriction related to achieving the
legitimate penological interest of equal treatment of male and fe-
male prisoners. Therefore, it did not violate Goodwin's constitu-
tional right to beget a child. The court deferred to the Bureau's
decision to deny Goodwin's request based on the interest of equal
treatment of inmates. The Bureau reasoned that if male inmates
were permitted to artificially inseminate other persons, female in-
mates would have to be granted the right to be inseminated. Since
the Bureau believed that this would jeopardize prison security and
sound correctional policy dictates against allowing inmates to artificially insemi-
nate another person. . .. [l]f [artificial insemination were] allowed in one case,
all of [the Bureau's] institutions would either have to develop collection, han-
dling, and storage procedures for semen or be opened up to private medical or
technical persons to come in to collect the semen. This situation would either
require a significant drain on resources or create significant security risks, espe-
cially in connection with inmates with a high security classification. . . . The
Bureau strives, to the extent possible, to treat all inmates equally. Therefore, in
connection with indigent inmates, the Executive Staff felt that the Bureau would
be in the position of having to either provide or pay for these services for these
inmates and, with respect to female inmates, to significantly expand the medical
services available.
Id. at 1397-98.
8. Id. at 1397.
9. Id. at 1406 n.6 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1397; see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
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would require costly expenditures for additional medical services,
the Bureau prohibited male inmates from inseminating others.11
This comment will examine in detail both the majority and
dissenting opinions, concluding that the Bureau's equal treatment
policy does not require the Bureau to permit female inmates to be
inseminated if male inmates are permitted to inseminate
noninmates. Therefore, the Bureau's interest of equal treatment is
not legitimate, and the Eighth Circuit should have granted Good-
win's petition for habeas corpus.
I. HISTORY
The Constitution protects both single and married individuals
from "unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting [them] as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."12 While it is "clear that imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights,"13 "[n]o 'iron
curtain' separates" prisoners from the Constitution.' 4 Limitations
on a prisoner's constitutional rights "arise both from the fact of
incarceration and from valid penological objectives-including de-
terrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional se-
curity."' 5 "In Turner v. Safley, [the Supreme Court] held that the
proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation
claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask
whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests.' "'s The Supreme Court has "made quite clear
that [this] standard of review . . . applies to all circumstances in
which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional
rights. 1' 7 The Court has held that "such a standard is necessary if
'prison administrators 
. . ., and not the courts, [are] to make the
il. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398-1400.
12. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
13. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984); accord Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974) ("We start with the familiar proposition that '[1]awful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights .
(quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948))).
14. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.
15. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
16. Washington v. Harper, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990) (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
17. Id. at 1038; see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1879 (1989) (Height-
ened scrutiny is "not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are centrally con-
cerned with the maintenance of order and security within prisons.").
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difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.' "18
While the Supreme Court has made the applicability of the
reasonableness standard clear, the Court has struggled to recon-
cile previous decisions suggesting that a heightened level of scru-
tiny may be appropriate in some prison cases. For example, in
Procunier v. Martinez,'9 the Supreme Court applied a heightened
level of scrutiny to review a regulation permitting prisoner mail
censorship. 0 In a subsequent opinion, however, the Supreme
Court has characterized Martinez as a special case.2' Specifically,
the Court stated that
a careful reading of Martinez suggests that our rejection of the
regulation at issue resulted not from a least restrictive means
requirement, but from our recognition that the regulated activity
centrally at issue in that case---outgoing personal correspon-
dence from prisoners-did not, by its very nature, pose a serious
threat to prison order and security.22
Martinez, therefore, may require a heightened level of scrutiny
only when the prison regulation at issue is justified by a concern
other than security.
The Turner v. Safley reasonableness standard has also been
irregularly applied in cases raising equal protection challenges to
prison regulations. Some courts apply the reasonableness stan-
dard;23 others apply a -heightened level of scrutiny;2 4 still others
have not found it necessary to decide this issue. 5 Since Goodwin's
18. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)).
19. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
20. Id. at 413-14. The Court applied the following level of scrutiny:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression ...
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.
Id. at 413.
21. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1880 & n.10 (1989).
22. Id. at 1880.
23. See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Thorn-
burgh, 907 F.2d 194, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (lower level of scrutiny appropriate when stat-
ute does not facially draw a gender-based distinction).
24. Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989); McMurry v.
Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 767 (W.D. La. 1982); Batton v. State Gov't, 501 F. Supp. 1173,
1176 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
25. Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1990) (even under the height-
ened level of scrutiny the plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated); Madyun v.
Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
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constitutional right to beget children has been violated, even under
the Turner v. Safley deferential standard of review, it is unneces-
sary to decide which standard should apply here.
In deciding whether the challenged regulation meets the rea-
sonableness test, four factors are to be considered. "First, there
must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regula-
tion and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to jus-
tify it."'28 Second, where the prisoner retains alternative means of
exercising the right, courts should be "particularly conscious of
the 'measure of judicial deference owed to correction officials.' "27
Third, a court must consider "the impact of accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right . ..on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally. ' z8 "Finally,
the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness
of a prison regulation."29 Prison officials, however, are not re-
quired "to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alterna-
tive method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional com-
plaint."30 Despite the fact that all Goodwin requested was a clean
container in which to deposit his ejaculate and a means of swiftly
transporting the container outside the prison, the majority held
that the Bureau's denial of this request was reasonable.
II. Goodwin v. Turner
A. The Majority Opinion
The issue on appeal to the Eighth Circuit was whether the
policy of the Bureau prohibiting all inmates from inseminating an-
other violates their right of privacy. The two member majority,
Judge Magill writing, held that the prohibition was reasonable
and did not offend the inmates' due process right to beget
children.3'
The majority first assumed, without deciding, that Goodwin
retained his right to procreate while incarcerated.3 2 It then consid-
ered the appropriate level of scrutiny for reviewing the prison reg-
26. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
586 (1984)).
27. Id. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 90-91.
31. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 1398.
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ulation. Goodwin argued that since "the prison regulation has a
direct impact on his wife's right to procreate, it should be subject
to strict scrutiny."33 The majority rejected this argument, reason-
ing that incarceration by its nature affects the rights of family
members.3 4 Applying the reasonableness test, the majority first
held that even though Goodwin's request was relatively simple,
the prohibition of insemination was rationally related to the legiti-
mate penological objective of equal protection among inmates.3 5
Second, the majority held that the absence of alternatives open to
Goodwin to exercise his right to procreate was additional evidence
of the reasonableness of the regulation. Finally, the majority held
that the accommodation of Goodwin's request would "force the
Bureau to grant its female inmates expanded medical services,
thereby diverting resources from security and other legitimate pe-
nological interests."36
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge McMillan dissented, arguing that the majority was in-
correct in holding the regulation reasonable.3 7 The dissent main-
tained that an inmate retains his or her right to procreate while
incarcerated.8 8 The dissent, therefore, did not reach the issue of
the appropriate level .of scrutiny for the prison regulation,39 since
the dissent would overturn the regulation even under the deferen-
tial reasonableness standard.40
33. Id. at 1399.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1399-1400. The majority noted that the Bureau asserted several other in-
terests that were not relevant to Goodwin's request to artificially inseminate his wife. Id. at
1399 n.7. These other asserted interests were decreased burden on the welfare rolls, tort
liability, and interests relating to a sophisticated artificial insemination procedure. Id.
36. Id. at 1400.
37. The dissent also disagreed with the majority as to whether it was appropriate to
apply the reasonableness test when the District Court had failed to do so. The District
Court never reached the question of the reasonableness of the regulation, since it held that
an inmate has no fundamental right to procreate. Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F.Supp. 1452,
1453-54 (W.D. Mo. 1988). Thus, the dissent argued that it was improper for the Court of
Appeals to review the regulation de novo under this reasonableness test. The dissent as-
serted that at a minimum, the case should be remanded to the District Court with instruc-
tions to apply the reasonableness test "in the first instance." Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d
1395, 1401, 1404 (8th Cir. 1990) (McMillian, J., dissenting). However, a thorough analy-
sis of this issue is beyond the scope of this comment.
38. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1401.03 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1401 & n.1 (McMillian, J., dissenting).




The novel issue that confronted the Court of Appeals was
whether prohibiting male inmates from inseminating noninmates
is a violation of the constitutional right to father a child. When
reviewing regulations to determine their constitutionality, the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny must first be determined.41 There are
two levels of scrutiny that federal courts apply in cases that chal-
lenge prison regulations on equal protection grounds.42 However,
Goodwin's constitutional right to beget children has been violated
even under a deferential standard.
Applying the reasonableness standard, therefore, the Su-
preme Court has directed lower courts to consider four factors in
determining whether the regulation is reasonable.4 a The first fac-
tor requires a rational connection between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest claimed to justify the
regulation. 44 Both the majority45 and dissent46 agreed that, as a
general matter, equal protection among inmates is a legitimate
government interest. However, the majority and .dissent disagreed
as to whether the equal protection interest had to be the constitu-
tional standard or merely a Bureau-created policy of equal treat-
ment of the sexes. The majority, citing Madyun v Franzen,47 held
that while the Constitution may not require equal protection
among inmates for the right of procreation, the Bureau-created
policy of equal treatment would.48 Thus, the majority reasoned
that the Bureau did not have to accommodate Goodwin's simple
41. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990). When considering
prison regulations, however, the court must first determine whether the asserted right is
constitutionally protected and whether that right survives incarceration. The majority as-
sumed, without deciding, that the right to procreate survives incarceration. Id. at 1398.
The dissent analyzed this issue and held that the right survives incarceration. Id. at 1401-
03 (McMillian, J., dissenting). Since a thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope
of this comment, this comment assumes, as the majority assumed, that the right to procrea-
tion survives incarceration.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
44. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
45. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399.
46. Id. at 1405 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
47. Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996
(1983).
48. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400 ("We merely note that as a matter of the Bureaus
established prison policy, and not as a matter of constitutional law, if male inmates are
allowed to procreate, the Bureau will either be forced to accord some similar benefit on its
female inmates or compromise its legitimate policy.").
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request. The accommodation would, at the very least, compromise
prison policy "because the Bureau cannot afford to expand its
medical services for its female prisoners to accommodate their de-
sire to procreate.49 The majority concluded that since Bureau pol-
icy would be compromised, the denial of Goodwin's request was
rationally related to the Bureau-created policy of equal
protection.5 0
The majority also rejected Goodwin's argument that the ac-
commodation of female inmates' right to procreate in prison was
an issue to be decided another day in the context of an actual
case.5 1 The majority's rejection of Goodwin's argument followed
from its acceptance of the Bureau's own analysis of its obligations
under its equal treatment policy. The Bureau claimed that if male
inmates were permitted to inseminate noninmates, Bureau policy
would require that significant financial and prison resources be de-
voted to support a similar benefit for female inmates. 2
The dissent argued that the Bureau-created equal treatment
policy was legitimate "as a general matter [but] not . . . when it
[was] accomplished at the expense of denying the exercise of an
otherwise accommodatable constitutional right."5 3 The dissent
further argued that denying Goodwin this right was not rationally
connected to the equal treatment policy. The dissent reasoned that
if the Bureau-created policy of equal treatment was a sufficient
basis to deny accommodatable constitutional rights, prisons would
never be required to accommodate such rights "because it is quite
likely that any asserted right might legitimately be withheld from
some inmates somewhere." '54 Additionally, the dissent asserted
that male and female inmates did not have to be treated similarly
with respect to the right of procreation. 55
The majority's holding on the first Turner v. Safley56 factor is




52. See supra note 47.
53. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1405 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (McMillan, J., dissenting). The dissent did not, however, indicate whether the
constitutional equal protection interest would be sufficient to deny an otherwise accom-
modatable constitutional right.
55. See id. at 1405 (McMillan, J., dissenting) ("[E]qual treatment is not rationally
furthered by denying all inmates a constitutional right simply because it might be legiti-
mately be denied to some." (emphasis in original)).
56. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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Franzen, 57 as support for the proposition that the Bureau-created
equal treatment interest was legitimate.58 However, the facts of
Madyun are not sufficiently analogous to those in Goodwin to sup-
port the majority's conclusion. Madyun involved a prison regula-
tion that permitted male and female prison guards to frisk search
male inmates while female inmates were subject to frisk searches
only by female guards.59 Madyun's claim was that male inmates
were treated unequally and should be afforded the right to be frisk
searched only by male guards. Maydun unlike Goodwin, thus in-
volved a regulation that treated inmates unequally and did not
seek to justify the regulation at issue by reference to a policy of
equal treatment of prisoners. Instead, the Madyun court denied
the male inmates' equal protection challenge and held that the
disparity in treatment of male and female prisoners was justified
by the state's policy of providing job opportunities for women
guards.6 0 Thus, the focus in Madyun was not equal protection
among the inmates, as in Goodwin, but equal protection among
prison guards. The state's interest in equalizing opportunity for
guards prevailed over the male prisoner's right to be searched by a
member of the same sex.61 In addition, while the Madyun court
did state that male and female inmates should be treated equally
while in prison, that court also stated that "prison administrators
should have a reasonable degree of flexibility in affording different
treatment to male and female inmates in the interest of security
or other legitimate penological functions. '62 Thus, Madyun does
not persuasively support the majority's holding that the Bureau-
created policy of equal treatment of prisoners is sufficient to deny
an otherwise accommodatable constitutional right to those
prisoners.
The majority's holding also opens the door for prison officials
to fabricate policies to deny prisoners accommodatable rights. The
majority uncritically accepted the Bureau's equal treatment pol-
57. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399 (citing Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 962 (7th
Cir.) ("male and female inmates must receive substantially equal facilities and conditions
while in prison"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
58. Id. at 1399 ("[T]he prison prohibition on inmate procreation ... is rationally
related to the Bureau's interest of treating all inmates equally .
59. Madyun, 704 F.2d at 961.
60. Id. at 962.
61. Id. ("The right to be searched by a member of one's own sex ...is hardly a
right that can be analogized to the . . . vocational programs that courts have required
prisons to provide on an equal basis.").
62. Id.
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icy. Once accepted, the equal treatment policy could be used to
deny "any asserted right.""3
Furthermore, the majority recognized a second interest in not
compromising the Bureau-created policy of equal treatment. The
Bureau could, therefore, fabricate a policy designed to deny pris-
oner rights and then defend the deprivation based on the interest
of not compromising the policy. In fact, it is possible that the
equal treatment interest in Goodwin was fabricated. The Bureau
asserted several interests to deny Goodwin's request to inseminate
his wife. 64 Both the majority65 and the dissent66 held that all the
interests asserted by the Bureau, with the exception of the equal
treatment interest, were not legitimate. Thus, the Bureau may
have fabricated as many interests as possible including the equal
treatment interest in order that at least one interest would be ac-
cepted by the reviewing court.
Finally, the Bureau did not indicate how its policy of equal
treatment would be compromised if Goodwin's request were
granted while female inmates were denied the right to be insemi-
nated. Obvious physical differences between males and females
should justify treating the two groups differently. Male inmates'
requests may be accommodated by providing them with a clean
container and means for swiftly transporting the container outside
the prison. Female inmates who wish to carry a fetus until deliv-
ery, however, would require "'special medical services . . . [and]
special diet, exercise, and other pre- and post-natal care.' "167 Thus
it is clear that accommodating male inmates has different conse-
quences than accommodating female inmates. Granting only the
male inmates' requests, therefore, would be permissible, since
"[c]ourts have recognized that different treatment of male and fe-
male inmates does not necessarily offend equal protection. 6 8
63. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1405 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
64. See supra note 31 (describing the interests asserted by the Bureau).
65. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399 n.7.
66. Id. at 1404 n.4 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1400 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 2223).
68. Id. at 1406 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (citing Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d
1450, 1454-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (prison policy of incarcerating female and male inmates in
different prisons does not violate equal protection because of the government's interest in
preventing overcrowding and the tradition of gender separation); Morrow v. Harwell, 768
F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1985) (prison policy granting more visiting hours to male inmates
does not violate equal protection since male inmates constitute a greater portion of the
prison population)); see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
136 (1977) ("There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all
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A careful analysis of Turner v. Safley supports the proposi-
tion that male inmates need not be deprived of an accommodat-
able right because female inmates are denied that right, if the
right may be provided to male inmates without having a negative
effect on prison security and resources. Turner v. Safley concerned
a regulation prohibiting inmate marriages unless the inmate could
demonstrate compelling reasons for the marriage. The Supreme
Court held that the regulation swept too broadly. "Prison officials
testified that generally they had experienced no problem with the
marriage of male inmates . . . . The proffered justification thus
does not explain the adoption of a rule banning marriages by these
[male] inmates."' 9 Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
prison officials may permit male inmates to marry while prohibit-
ing female inmates if the interests in security and rehabilitation
were threatened only by the female inmates' marriages. There-
fore, Turner v. Safley supports the proposition that the Bureau
could permit male inmates to inseminate noninmates while
prohibiting female inmates from being inseminated. The dissent's
argument that the Bureau-created policy of equal treatment was
not legitimate or rationally furthered by denying all inmates the
right to procreate is persuasive.
The second Turner v. Safley factor teaches that where the
prisoner retains alternative means of exercising the right denied
by prison officials, courts should be particularly aware of the def-
erence owed to prison officials. 70 The majority and the dissent
agreed that there were no obvious alternatives to Goodwin's sim-
ple request to be provided with a clean container and means for
transporting the container to his wife.7 ' The dissent reasoned,
therefore, that the prison officials' determination need not be af-
forded as much deference as it would have been were several al-
ternatives available to Goodwin. The dissent concluded that the
second factor weighed in favor of Goodwin's right of
inmate groups alike where differentiation is necessary to avoid an imminent threat of insti-
tutional disruption or violence."); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1990)
(equal protection not violated by allowing female prison guards to pat search male inmates
in one prison and prohibiting male guards from pat searching female inmates in a different
prison due to differences between the two prisoner populations); Id. at 1101 n.12 (listing
cases in accord from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
69. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 98-99.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400; Id. at 1405-06 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
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procreation. 2
The majority, however, drew a different conclusion. "The
lack of. . .alternative avenues stems from the fact that none can
exist without compromising prison policy . . . ., The majority
then discounted the lack of alternatives and held that the second
factor weighed in favor of the prison regulation. 74 The dissent spe-
cifically took issue with the majority for considering prison admin-
istration interests as part of this factor. The dissent appears to
have the more persuasive argument, since Turner v. Safley man-
dates that prison interests be weighed in the third factor and not
the second. 5 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court considered a
regulation prohibiting inmate-to-inmate correspondence except for
compelling reasons. The Supreme Court found that there were al-
ternative means of exercising the right available to the inmates;
'"the ... regulation does not deprive prisoners of all means of
expression. Rather, it bars communication only with a limited
class of other people with whom prison officials have particular
cause to be concerned-inmates at other institutions . ". .., The
Supreme Court's clear focus is on the prisoners' ability to exercise
their right to correspond with others, not the administration's rea-
son for curtailing that right. Thus, the dissent's interpretation that
prison interests should not be considered in the second factor was
correct, and the second factor weighs in favor of granting Good-
win's request to inseminate his wife.
The third Turner v. Safley factor assesses the impact of ac-
commodating the right at issue on guards, other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources.77 The majority and the dissent
disagreed on what right was to be accommodated. The majority
reasoned that if male inmates were permitted to inseminate
noninmates, the Bureau-created policy of equal treatment would
require that female inmates be afforded the right to be insemi-
nated. The majority therefore considered the right at issue to be
that of male prisoners to inseminate others and female prisoners
to be inseminated by others. The risks and costs of accommodat-
72. Id. (McMillan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1400.
74. Id.
75. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 90 ("A third consideration is the impact accommo-
dation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally.").
76. Id. at 92.
77. Id. at 90.
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ing male and female inmates were then considered under this fac-
tor. The majority concluded that these costs weighed in favor of
denying both male and female inmates the right to procreate. 8
The dissent, however, assessed the impact of accommodating
a more narrow right. Judge McMillan concluded that male and
female inmates did not have to be treated equally with respect to
the right to procreate.79 The dissent, therefore, argued that the
impact of permitting the insemination of female inmates should
not be considered in the third factor. The majority implicitly ac-
knowledged that Goodwin's request could be accommodated with-
out any impact on the inmates or prison resources by focusing its
assessment of the third Turner v. Safley factor on the costs of
providing "expanded medical service"80 to female inmates. Since
accommodating Goodwin's request would require only the nomi-
nal expense of supplying a clean container and transporting the
container outside the prison, his request would not jeopardize
prison security or resources. Therefore, the third factor also
weighs in favor of granting Goodwin's request.
Finally, the fourth Turner v. Safley factor indicates that the
lack of ready regulatory alternatives is proof of the reasonableness
of the prison regulation.81 The majority held that there were no
alternatives and, therefore, this factor weighed against accommo-
dating Goodwin's request.8 2 The dissent presented two alternatives
to the Bureau's policy of categorically prohibiting all inmates
from procreating. The first alternative was that insemination re-
quests should be considered on a case-by-case basis. If the individ-
ual request would unduly burden the prison, then it need not be
granted.83 The second alternative would be to promulgate a policy
permitting insemination only if the inmate's request would not sig-
nificantly burden the prison.84 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme
Court endorsed alternatives that accommodate constitutional
rights on a case-by-case basis. One prison regulation at issue pro-
78. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1399-1400.
79. See supra text accompanying note 55.
80. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400.
81. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 90-91.
82. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1400. The dissent apparently missed the majority's holding
on the fourth factor, possibly because it was contained in a single paragraph along with the
third factor. Id. at 1407 (McMillan, J., dissenting) ("The final Turner factor, which the
majority does not apply ....").
83. Id. at 1407 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (McMillan, J., dissenting).
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hibited all inmate marriages unless the prisoner was able to show
compelling reasons for the marriage. The Supreme Court held
that there were simple alternatives that would only impose a de
minimis cost on the prison. The alternative the Court suggested
was to permit inmate marriages as a general rule unless the war-
den found it a threat to prison security. 85 Thus, the Supreme
Court clearly favors alternatives that do not unconditionally deny
a constitutional right to prisoners. Therefore, since alternative
prison regulations may be found, the fourth Turner v. Safley fac-
tor weighs in favor of accommodating Goodwin's request.
All four Turner v. Safley factors, therefore, weigh in favor of
granting Goodwin's request. The policy of equal treatment of pris-
oners is a legitimate governmental interest as a general matter,
but it is not rationally related to prohibiting all inmates from in-
seminating others. Other than artificial insemination, there were
no alternative means available to Goodwin to exercise his right of
procreation. Goodwin's request could be accommodated with a
minimal impact on the prison. Finally, there were alternatives to
the absolute prohibition of insemination. Since all four Turner v.
Safley factors favor granting Goodwin's request, the majority was
incorrect in denying it.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Goodwin v. Turner is flawed on a
number of grounds, suggesting that the dissent should have pre-
vailed. Chief among these is the majority's deference to the Bu-
reau-created interest of equal treatment of prisoners and the ma-
jority's recognition of a rational connection between the interest
and the regulation at issue. There is no reason female inmates
must be permitted to be inseminated if male inmates are permit-
ted to inseminate noninmates. There was, therefore, no rational
connection between the Bureau-created interest of equal treat-
ment and the prohibition of all inmates from inseminating others.
Thus, the dissent had the more persuasive argument. The prison
regulation violated Goodwin's right to procreate, and Goodwin's
writ of habeas corpus should have been granted.
IRAH H. DONNER
85. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 98.
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